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Abstract 
 
Imprisonment rates are presumed to have risen in the west, and it is argued by certain 
social scientists that this can be explained by a comprehensive process of economic neo-
liberalisation. In this paper, we develop an alternative explanation, focussing on the rise 
of a ‘new political culture’. Longitudinal cross-national analyses are performed to test the 
tenability of these theories. First, it is demonstrated that some countries have been 
witnessing a trend of penalisation, but that there is no overall trend. Second, economic 
explanations for variations in imprisonment rates prove to be untenable. Third, it is 
shown that a new-rightist demand for social order, which is not found to be inspired by 
economic neo-liberalisation, provides a better explanation. This leads to the conclusion 
that high incarceration rates can be understood as being part of a right-authoritarian 
politico-cultural complex. 
 
Keywords: Imprisonment, Neo-liberalisation, New Political Culture, New-rightist 
politics, Penalisation.
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1. Imprisonment rates on the rise? 
 
As more and more people seem to be imprisoned in North America, Western Europe, and 
Australia nowadays, the topic of penalisation is a hot issue in contemporary criminology. 
Among the most prominent scholars studying this topic is French sociologist Loïc 
Wacquant. In publications like Prisons of Poverty (2002 [1999]) and Punishing the Poor 
(2008),1 he has developed a comprehensive materialist explanation for the ongoing trend 
of penalisation he signals in countries on these continents. 
 While it is clear his theory concerns these western countries – sometimes referred 
to as economically advanced societies – Wacquant is ambiguous about its exact scope. 
On the one hand he states ‘the signal fact of the end of the century is without doubt the 
tremendous inflation of prison populations in all advanced societies’ (2001: 404, italics 
added). On the other hand, however, he suggests that the situation in Europe differs from 
that in the United States: ‘in Europe, the dice is not yet cast, far from it. (…) carceral 
inflation is not inevitable’ (2001: 409, cf. 1999: 216). Recently his reservation has faded, 
as Wacquant states that penalisation is characteristic of the United States for the past 
thirty years, and of Western Europe for the past fifteen years (2006: 16). As it remains 
unclear in which countries a trend of penalisation has occurred, our first hypothesis 
concerns this issue and states that incarceration rates did rise in North America, Western 
Europe, and Australia. 
Of course, if imprisonment rates prove to vary in time, this calls for an 
explanation. The common sense explanation focusing on rising crime rates does not hold, 
as the presumed rise in imprisonment has occurred in an age of stable or declining crime 
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rates (Garland, 2001: 106; Hudson, 2002: 251; Wacquant, 2006: 16), and there is no clear 
relation between crime and imprisonment rates (Wilkins and Pease, 1987; Garland, 2001: 
208; Von Hofer, 2003; cf. Cavadino and Dignan, 2006: 447). Instead, Wacquant follows 
a neo-Marxist way of reasoning, which is expounded in section 2.1. An alternative to this 
economic theory is an explanation focussing on the rise of the so-called ‘new political 
culture’, which is discussed in section 2.2. 
 
2. Explaining penalisation 
 
2.1 Penalisation and neo-liberalisation 
According to Wacquant’s theory, large numbers of people are incarcerated ‘due to the 
increasingly frequent, indeed routine, use of imprisonment as an instrument for managing 
social insecurity’ (2001: 404). This social insecurity has been brought about by economic 
developments related to the transformation of the ‘Keynesian’ into a ‘Darwinian’ state 
(Wacquant, 2001, 2006). Whereas the former was based on the principle of solidarity and 
a prominent role for the state in economic redistribution, the latter is characterised by 
neo-liberal, or free-market measures such as state withdrawal from the economic sphere, 
and ‘makes a fetish of competition and celebrates individual responsibility (whose 
counterpart is collective irresponsibility)’ (Wacquant, 2001: 405, italics in original; cf. 
2006: 26).  
Thus, a less generous and less comprehensive system of welfare benefits is 
considered to be an important factor explaining penalisation (see also Wacquant, 1999: 
215). This line of thought, which is followed by other scholars as well (Hudson, 2002; 
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see for instance Beckett and Western, 2001; Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Downes and 
Hansen, 2006), is aptly summarised by Greenberg (2001: 81): ‘locking people up or 
giving them money might be considered alternative ways of handling marginal, poor 
populations’.  
 Although a tightening welfare regime is a prominent feature, Wacquant discusses 
the advent of the Darwinian state as a more comprehensive process, including a 
polarising labour market with increasing employment in services, leading to an increase 
in insecure flexible labour, individualised labour contracts and discontinued or 
fragmented careers (2006: 25-6). These economic developments, indicating ‘the 
generalization of precarious employment’ (Wacquant, 1999: 215), are considered to 
cause increasing social insecurity as well. He argues these intertwined processes are 
justified by a neo-liberal discourse, which main features are the ‘competition fetish’ and 
the emphasis on ‘collective irresponsibility’ characteristic of the Darwinian state. This 
discourse holds the individual fully responsible for its own fate and actions in an age of 
growing social insecurity (Wacquant, 2006: 26-34). 
 According to Wacquant, this combination of declining welfare benefits, rising 
numbers of insecure flexible labour contracts, and a neo-liberal discourse leads to 
‘surplus labour’. Deprived of steady employment and income, this labour surplus is held 
responsible for ‘petty’ or ‘survival’ crime – crime committed to cope with precarious 
economic conditions – and subsequently gets criminalised. In this way, the Keynesian 
welfare state, which was based on solidarity with and inclusion of the economically 
deprived, transforms into a Darwinian ‘penal state’ – a competitive state in which 
marginal populations are routinely imprisoned. Social insecurity is thus managed by 
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means of incarceration – a process indicated by Wacquant as ‘punishing the poor’ (2006) 
and ‘the penal management of poverty’ (1999, 2002 [1999]). 
 Wacquant has not put his propositions to a direct empirical test. Instead, he 
illustrates his theory by sketching inflation in incarceration in the US in recent decades, 
and by showing that the subsequent rise in expenditure on imprisonment is accompanied 
by a decline in generosity when it comes to welfare benefits (Wacquant, 2005, 2006). 
Others did perform empirical tests, but only of a part of Wacquant’s more comprehensive 
theory: they focused on the proposition that lower expenditures on welfare benefits lead 
to higher levels of incarceration. Although Cavadino and Dignan do not find support for 
this thesis when assessing this relationship for twelve OECD countries (2006), Downes 
and Hansen do if nineteen OECD countries are under assessment (2006), just as Beckett 
and Western find partial support for this thesis in the US (2001).  
Only the study of Downes and Hansen (2006) seems to provide a serious test, 
though, since only they use longitudinal data and subsequently show there is an impact of 
declining welfare expenditures on imprisonment in the west. Nevertheless, Downes and 
Hansen (2006) rightly argue that further research is needed, because they merely focus on 
a bivariate relationship and consider but two points in time. Besides, it is important to 
stress that Wacquant’s theory on the rise of the penal state includes more causes than 
declining welfare benefits: a rising number of insecure, flexible jobs and a neo-liberal 
discourse are considered to be relevant as well. Therefore, we aim to assess whether these 
economic changes and the spread of this discourse are really related to imprisonment 
rates in the west. To do so, we will test the following hypotheses: low welfare generosity 
and low expenditures on welfare benefits are positively related to imprisonment rates 
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(hypothesis 2), flexible labour is positively associated with imprisonment rates 
(hypothesis 3), and support for neo-liberal policies is positively correlated with 
imprisonment rates (hypothesis 4). 
 
2.2 Penalisation and the new political culture 
It remains to be seen whether increased rates of incarceration actually result from a 
comprehensive process of economic neo-liberalisation. An alternative explanation suggests 
that what may have been decisive instead is the emergence of a new political culture that 
revolves around cultural issues rather than issues of class and economic distribution – above all 
the amplification of the quest for national unity and national identity. 
As is well known, the counterculture of the 1960s and 1970s featured well-educated 
middle-class youth protesting against a bureaucratised, technocratic, capitalist society (‘the 
system’) that was seen as suffocating individual liberty and as such perceived as a threat to the 
quest for individual self-attainment (cf. Roszak 1969; Zijderveld 1970). These morally 
individualist values have not disappeared since, but have only become more widespread 
according to Inglehart’s studies of a gradually unfolding ‘silent revolution’ (1977) or process 
of ‘postmodernisation’ (1997), in which so-called post-materialist values like individual liberty 
and self-expression gain momentum over materialist issues. Since post-materialism in the 
materialism/post-materialism index actually measures libertarianism, the rise of post-
materialist values witnessed by Inglehart really means that a shift from authoritarian to 
libertarian values occurred in recent decades (Flanagan, 1979; 1982; 1987; Kitschelt, 1995; 
Middendorp, 1991; XXX1). However, this does not undermine the central tenet of Inglehart’s 
theory of the silent revolution: values pertaining to individual liberty have moved centre stage 
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since the 1960s and 1970s. What we have been witnessing since then is the emergence of a 
‘new political culture’ around these values, and post-industrial cultural politics has accordingly 
increasingly replaced class politics as the principal focus of political conflict (Dalton et al. 
1984; Rempel and Clark 1997; Clark 1998, 2001; Hechter 2004; XXX2; XXX5). 
Since the 1980s, however, a rightist branch of new cultural politics has emerged, 
basically driven by deeply felt dismay about left-libertarian cultural politics as the offshoot of 
the counterculture.2 In the United States, the new Christian right gained momentum under the 
presidency of Ronald Reagan, and has remained voicefully present ever since, pathologising 
the morally individualist and relativist values of the counterculture. In these new-rightist (i.e.  
culturally conservative) circles, as Thomas Frank observes, ‘the counterculture’ and ‘the 
sixties’ have become synonyms for ‘a ten-year fall from grace, the loss of a golden age of 
consensus, the end of an edenic epoch of shared values and safe centrism’ (1998: 1), while ‘in 
the nation’s politics, sixties- and hippie-bashing remains a trump card only slightly less 
effective than red-baiting was in earlier times’ (idem: 3). 
Most European countries have been witnessing the emergence of new-rightist 
movements and parties since the 1980s as well. Like new-leftist parties, these new-rightist 
parties emphasise cultural issues more than anything else – yet do so from a right-authoritarian 
rather than a left-libertarian angle. They have been electorally successful all over Europe since 
the 1980s.3 Mockingly referring to a ‘silent counter-revolution’, Ignazi (1992, 2003) has 
consequently rightly critiqued Inglehart for his reduction of new cultural politics to its left-
libertarian branch only (see also Veugelers 2000). The importance of its right-authoritarian 
counterpart is underscored by the fact that the new-rightist parties all in all constitute no more 
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than the tip of an iceberg of politico-cultural change: many mainstream rightist parties in 
western countries have also moved in more authoritarian directions since the 1980s (XXX2). 
Besides striving for the strengthening of national unity and national identity, 
obstructing immigration, repressing non-national ethnic or cultural identities, and 
reaffirming traditional moral values, new-rightist parties political agenda’s across western 
countries all prominently feature crime fighting as a major vehicle to maintain order in 
the nation (XXX3; Ignazi 1992, 2003; Veugelers 2000). This suggests that increased 
incarceration rates may not so much be caused by the shift to neo-liberal economic 
policies as suggested by Wacquant, but may instead be a vital element of the new-rightist 
politico-cultural backlash stressing authoritarian measures to re-establish order in the 
nation. Our fifth hypothesis, in short, is that highest incarceration rates will be found in 
those countries and those periods in which this backlash is strongest. 
Although the historical materialist logic of Wacquant’s theory (see 2006: chapter 
1) implies this backlash is an economically driven phenomenon, the alternative theory 
suggests it is primarily a cultural phenomenon. In order to assess this cultural logic to 
explain the rise of the penal state, we will test our final hypothesis (hypothesis 6): support 
for new-rightist policies cannot be explained by low welfare generosity, low expenditures 
on welfare benefits, flexibilisation of labour, nor by support for neo-liberal policies. 
 
3. Data and measurement 
 
Since no complete data set covering imprisonment rates, ideological measures and  
welfare state measures are available, we have constructed our own using information 
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from various sources for as many countries as possible for an extended period. Since 
some data sources only cover a limited number of countries or a limited number of years, 
our analyses are restricted to sixteen countries (see for an overview table 1 below) in a 
ten year period (1992 to 2001), which largely corresponds with the time span discussed 
by Wacquant: in his most recent work he explicitly states that his theory covers 
developments in Europe for the last fifteen years, a period in which those in the Unites 
States are assumed to continue (2006: 16). Below we elaborate on the data sources and 
measures used to test our hypotheses. Descriptive statistics of all independent variables 
can be found in appendix 1. 
Imprisonment is measured for each country as the number of people in prison per 
100.000 inhabitants.4 These statistics are available from the International Centre for 
Prison Studies’ website, www.prisonstudies.org, for the years 1992, 1995, 1998, and 
2001.5 
Expenditures on welfare benefits is measured as the percentage of the gross 
domestic product spent on welfare benefits in a country. These statistics are available 
from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) website, 
www.OECD.org.  
Welfare generosity is measured using the so-called generosity index developed by 
Scruggs (2004), which is often used in comparative welfare state research (see, for 
example, Brooks and Manza, 2006). The index is based on individual rights to social 
security. Higher scores on this index indicate a larger compensation for lost income due 
to unemployment, disability and old age.  
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Flexible labour is measured as the incidence of temporary employment expressed 
as a percentage of total employment. These statistics are available from the OECD 
website as well.  
Support for neo-liberal policies is measured using political party manifesto data 
coded by Budge et al. (2001), who quantified all post-war party manifestos of major 
parties in the sixteen countries under observation. Each sentence and quasi-sentence in 
the party manifestos has been coded into one of 56 policy priorities. All sentences 
covering a policy priority are summed and expressed as a percentage of the total number 
of sentences in the document. A score on a policy priority thus reflects the space this 
priority occupies in the party manifesto.  
 Using these party-manifesto data, a scale was created by subtracting the attention 
for four policy priorities expressing support for traditional leftist policies of welfare state 
expansion and market intervention (‘Controlled economy’, ‘Economic planning’, 
‘Nationalisation’, and ‘Welfare state expansion’) from four policy priorities expressing 
support for neo-liberal economic policies of welfare state limitation and laissez-faire 
policies (‘Free enterprise’, ‘Economic incentives’, ‘Economic orthodoxy’, and ‘Welfare 
state limitation’). 
In order to create an indicator for the general level of support for neo-liberal 
policies for each country in each election year, the mean of all political parties was 
calculated. Doing so, we weighted for their share of the vote to account for their relative 
importance (cf. XXX2). Higher scores on this scale stand for more support for neo-liberal 
policies in a given country and year. 
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 Support for new-rightist policies is measured in a similar vein as support for neo-
liberal policies. The attention for three policy priorities expressing support for left-wing 
rejection of moral traditionalism and approval of cultural diversity (‘National way of life 
negative’, ‘Traditional morality negative’, and ‘Underprivileged minority groups’) was 
subtracted from two policy priorities expressing support for right-wing policies of 
restoration of the moral order (‘National way of life positive’ and ‘Traditional morality 
positive’).6 In order to construct an indicator for the general support for new-rightist 
policies for each country in each election year, the weighted mean of all political parties 
was calculated. (cf. XXX2). 
 
4. Results 
 
First we test the hypothesis that incarceration rates have risen in North America, Western 
Europe, and Australia (hypothesis 1). Since it is unclear for which countries this 
presumed trend holds, we have analysed trends for separate countries as well as the 
general trend.7 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
As table 1 indicates, temporal changes in imprisonment rates vary from country to 
country. Strikingly, no general trend seems to exist: the phenomenon of penalisation is 
not characteristic for the west as a whole in the ten year period under observation. 
Nevertheless, imprisonment rates have only significantly declined in Denmark, and have 
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risen in various countries: not only in the often discussed case of the United States, but 
also in Australia and in European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands. Thus, 
Wacquant seems partially right. Although no universal development can be discerned, 
incarceration has been on the rise in various western societies indeed. 
 The above indicates that imprisonment rates do change over time. The question is 
whether this temporal variation can be explained by Wacquant’s theory of economic neo-
liberalisation. To assess the tenability of this theory, we test the hypotheses derived from 
it by means of multi-level analyses so we can separate the variance in imprisonment rates 
at year level from the variance at country level (see table 2 for details). This is useful 
since Wacquant’s theory concerns a temporal process: its tenability obviously depends on 
its ability to explain variance at year level.  
Model 0 indicates a multi-level structure exists in the data: 62 per cent of the 
variance is located at the country level, while 38 per cent is located at the year level.8 
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
In model 1, we added the concrete aspects of economic neo-liberalisation discussed by 
Wacquant – indicators for expenditures on welfare benefits, welfare generosity, and 
flexible labour – in order to test hypotheses 2 and 3. According to hypothesis 2 low 
welfare generosity and low expenditures on welfare benefits are positively related to 
imprisonment rates, whereas hypothesis 3 predicts a positive association between flexible 
labour and imprisonment rates. None of these three indicators of economic neo-
liberalisation has a significant effect on imprisonment rates, and there is no explained 
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variance at year level at all. This means that a tightening of the welfare state and rising 
temporary employment are not related to imprisonment rates. Hence, both hypotheses are 
refuted. 
 In model 2, we added the indicator for support for the neo-liberal discourse that 
according to Wacquant underlies the process of penalisation. According to Wacquant’s 
theory, support for neo-liberal policies is positively correlated with imprisonment rates 
(hypothesis 4). Since this variable neither has a significant effect on incarceration rates, 
nor leads to any explained variance at year level, this last hypothesis pertaining to 
economic neo-liberalisation is rejected as well. All indicators for neo-liberalisation fail to 
significantly explain temporal variation in imprisonment rates, suggesting that 
Wacquant’s materialist explanation is empirically untenable. 
What is striking is that none of the indicators of economic neo-liberalisation show 
a significant positive trend for the ten-year period under scrutiny. In this period the 
expenditures on welfare benefits did not decline (Pearson’s r = -0.08, p = 0.54, N = 63), 
and welfare benefits did not get less generous (Pearson’s r = -0.06, p = 0.64, N = 63).  
Neither did a process of flexibilisation of labour occur (Pearson’s r = 0.09, p = 0.48, N = 
63), nor did levels of support for neo-liberal economic policies rise (Pearson’s r = 0.21, p 
= 0.10, N = 63). These findings (see appendix 1 for details) are at odds with accounts of 
scholars who argue that a process of neo-liberalisation has taken place (e.g. Korpi, 2003), 
but resonate with the work of Pierson (1991: 171) and Van Oorschot (2006), who found 
that social expenditures in various western countries have, to date, not declined at all or 
have even risen slightly (cf. Brooks and Manza, 2006). In short, economic neo-
liberalisation most likely fails to explain any temporal variation in imprisonment rates 
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because such a process did not occur in the period under observation. Contrarily, support 
for new-rightist policies did rise significantly in this period (Pearson’s r = 0.29, p = 0.02, 
N = 63), and might therefore provide a better explanation. 
To assess the validity of the alternative explanation relating to the rise of a right-
wing political culture, we added the indicator for support for new-rightist politics in 
model 3. Contrary to models 1 and 2, this model proved to be a significant improvement 
at 5% level.9 As predicted by hypothesis 5, this variable has a positive effect on 
imprisonment rates: the highest incarceration rates are found in those countries and those 
periods in which new-rightist politics are most prominent. Note that primarily temporal 
variation is accounted for: the explained variance at year level is 33 per cent, whilst that 
at country level is 18 per cent. Put differently, the rise in new-rightist politics explains 
rising incarceration rates. 
To separate the year-level variance from the country-level variance in 
imprisonment we have used multi-level analyses. However, the analyses presented are 
based on somewhat a-typical data – the number of years per country is rather low. 
Therefore we replicated the analyses using OLS multiple regression to test the robustness 
of our findings. As table 3 clearly shows, this yields the same results. 
 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
The assumption of uncorrelated observations underlying OLS multiple regression is 
violated in this analysis, but since the multi-level analyses yield similar results our 
findings seem to be robust. 
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Penalisation can be explained by a new-rightist political culture, whereas none of 
our indictors for economic neo-liberalisation has any impact. However, it remains to be 
seen whether these cultural developments can be explained by the economic processes 
discussed by Wacquant (hypothesis 6). Does a linkage exist between support for new-
rightist policies and welfare generosity, expenditures on welfare benefits, flexible labour, 
and support for economic neo-liberal policies? Table 4 sheds light on these matters by 
presenting bivariate relationships as well as standardised multiple regression coefficients. 
Even in the bivariate analysis, which provides the most lenient test, Wacquant’s 
materialist logic does not hold. No significant relationship is found between new-rightist 
policy preferences and the indicators for welfare generosity, expenditures on welfare 
benefits or neo-liberal discourse, while, surprisingly, flexible labour is negatively related 
to the former, whereas a materialist theory such as Wacquant’s would predict a positive 
association. 
 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
All in all, these findings suggest that we are indeed witnessing an independent 
politico-cultural backlash that explains penalisation. Naturally, economic neo-liberal 
policies can go hand in hand with new-rightist cultural ones, as the case of Reaganism 
illustrates. However, our findings indicate that these can be disentangled analytically as 
well as empirically. 
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
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Our findings indicate that there is no general trend of penalisation in the west. However, 
incarceration rates have risen since the early 1990s in various countries. Two theories to 
account for this temporal variation in imprisonment rates are put forward in this paper: on 
the one hand Wacquant’s materialist theory focussing on a process of economic neo-
liberalisation, and on the other hand a theory drawing on the rise of a new political 
culture. 
 None of our indicators of economic neo-liberalisation has any effect on 
imprisonment rates. Even in our broad analyses, which are better suited to test 
Wacquant’s comprehensive theory than research merely focusing on welfare 
expenditures (see Beckett and Western, 2001; Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Downes and 
Hansen, 2006), no empirical support for a materialist explanation was found. Moreover, 
no evidence was found for the presumed process of economic neo-liberalisation that lies 
at the core of Wacquant’s theory: in a ten year period expenditures on welfare benefits 
did not decline and the welfare state did not get less generous. Neither did a process of 
flexibilisation of labour take place, nor did levels of support for neo-liberal economic 
policies increase. In short, all of our findings put Wacquant’s theory seriously in doubt – 
at least for the period that most closely resembles the time span indicated in his recent 
work (2006: 16). 
 Contrarily, the alternative theory focusing on the rise of a new political culture 
centred on cultural issues was empirically corroborated. The rise of a new-rightist 
political culture provides an explanation for penalisation, while economic neo-
liberalisation does not: penalisation seems to be part of a broader new-rightist current 
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emphasising social order in the nation. In the light of Wacquant’s materialist line of 
reasoning, it is important to note that support for new-rightist politics is not caused by 
economic neo-liberalisation. While indicators of the latter shows no temporal trend at all, 
the former has risen significantly in recent decades (cf. XXX2). That previous research 
indicates that this new-rightist rise is most severe in countries where support for new-
leftist politics was strong in the 1960s and 1970s (XXX6) underpins that penalisation can 
be understood as being part of a right-authoritarian politico-cultural backlash aimed at 
restoring order in the nation. 
As our findings indicate that this process is not driven by economic insecurity, it 
is likely that an explanation could be provided by rising levels of cultural insecurity. In a 
cultural transformation that can be labelled as ‘reflexive modernization’ (Giddens, 1994), 
‘postmodernization’ (Bauman, 1995) or ‘detraditionalization’ (Heelas, 1996), moral 
authorities such as the church have lost their once taken-for-granted legitimacy for many 
in the west. The cultural insecurity brought about by this decline in clear-cut guidelines 
for thinking, feeling, and acting, has most likely formed the breeding ground for an 
authoritarian outcry for social order (see for instance Srole, 1956; McDill, 1961; 
Lutterman and Middleton, 1970; Middendorp, 1991; XXX4, who all demonstrate a clear 
relationship between cultural insecurity and authoritarianism). 
Given the theoretical implications of our findings that there is no relationship 
between penalisation and economic neo-liberalisation, we argue they merit further 
scrutiny. For instance, studies could focus on welfare state retrenchment and 
imprisonment within countries. One could, for example, study whether in a strongly neo-
liberalising context such as the Netherlands (Sainsbury 1996; Korpi 2003; Van Oorschot 
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2006) the economic insecure formerly dependent on welfare benefits, but now less or not 
entitled, have greater chances of being imprisoned. This would provide further insight 
into the tenability of the materialist theories put forward by Wacquant and others. 
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Notes
                                                
1
 As this title is not available in English yet, we base our argument on the French edition, Punir les Pauvres 
(2006). 
2
 New-rightist protests against the counter culture surely existed even in the 1960s and 1970s, although 
most of these remained marginal and politically unorganised phenomena at the fringe of society back then 
(Ransford 1972, Lyons 1996, Klatch 1999). 
3
 Examples are the FPÖ in Austria, the Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) in Switzerland, the Progress 
Party (FrP) and the Danish People’s Party (DF) in Denmark, the Progress Party (FrP) in Norway, the 
Vlaams Blok (renamed to Vlaams Belang in 2004) in Flanders, Belgium, the Republikäner in Germany, 
Front National in France, and – much more recent than any of the foregoing – the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) 
and Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) in the Netherlands. 
4
 We have centred the scores on this variable and all others around the mean. 
5
 These statistics are available for 2004 as well, but because the other data sources do not cover this year, 
our analyses only cover the period 1992-2001. 
6 The exact issues used in the scales and a short description of the items can be found below (copied from 
Budge et al., 2001). 
 
Item Item nr. Description 
Controlled 
economy 
per412 General need for direct government control of economy; control over prices, 
wages, rents, etc; state intervention into the economic system 
Economic 
planning 
per404 Favourable mentions of long-standing economic planning of a consultative or 
indicative nature, need for government to create such a plan 
Nationalisation per413 Favourable mentions of government ownership, partial or complete including 
government ownership of land 
Welfare state 
expansion 
per504 Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any social service 
or social security scheme; support for social services such as health service or 
social housing 
 20
                                                                                                                                            
Free enterprise per401 Favourable mentions of free enterprise capitalism; superiority of individual 
enterprise over state and control systems; favourable mentions of private 
property rights, personal enterprise and initiative; need for unhampered 
individual enterprise 
Economic 
incentives 
per402 Need for wage and tax policies to induce enterprise; encouragement to start 
enterprises; need for financial and other incentives such as subsidies 
Economic 
orthodoxy  
per414 Need for traditional economic orthodoxy, e.g. reduction of budget deficits, 
retrenchment in crisis, thrift and savings; support for traditional economic 
institutions such as stock market and banking system; support for strong 
currency 
Welfare state 
limitation 
per505 Limiting expenditure on social services or social security; otherwise as ”welfare 
state expansion”, but negative  
National way of 
life positive 
per601 Appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; suspension of some freedoms in order 
to protect the state against subversion; support for established national ideas 
Traditional 
morality 
positive 
per603 Favourable mentions of traditional moral values; prohibition censorship and 
suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour; maintenance and stability of 
family; religion 
National way of 
life negative 
per602 Against patriotism and/or nationalism; opposition to the existing national state; 
otherwise as “national way of life positive”, but negative 
Traditional 
morality 
negative 
per604 Opposition to traditional moral values; support for divorce, abortion, etc.; 
otherwise as “traditional morality positive”, but negative 
Under-
privileged 
minority groups 
per705 Favourable mentions to underprivileged minorities who are defined neither in 
economic nor in demographic terms, e.g. the handicapped, disabled, 
homosexuals, immigrants, refugees etc. 
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7
 
In order to investigate trends in time we calculated the zero-order correlation between year and 
imprisonment rates. As indicated by numerous studies monitoring over-time changes, for instance 
investigating trends in inequality (Marks & McMillan, 2003), happiness (Veenhoven, 2005; Veenhoven & 
Hagerty, 2006), secularisation (Crockett & Voas, 2006), opinion polarisation (Evans and Bryson 2001; 
Mouw and Sobel 2001), class voting (Nieuwbeerta 1996), assortative mating (Katrnák, Kreidl & Fónadová, 
2006) or BMI (Katzmarzyk & Davis, 2001; Leit, Pope & Gray, 2000; Garner, Garfinkel, Schwartz, & 
Thompson, 1980), the use of the Pearson’s product moment correlation – widely known as Pearson’s r -  is 
a standard way of assessing temporal changes.  
8
 The total variance is 0.74 + 0.46 = 1.20. The percentage at country level is 62 (100*0.74/1.20), and 38 
(100* 0.46/1.20) at year level. 
9
 The decline of -2ll is 30.75 – 24.01 = 6.74, which is enough since the critical value in the χ2-distribution 
is 3.8. 
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Tables 
Table 1 Trends in imprisonment 1992-2001 (Pearson’s r) 
Country Mean Trend N 
Australia 102.00 0.99** 4 
Austria 83.75 0.09 4 
Belgium 78.00 0.99** 4 
Canada 124.00 -0.54 4 
Denmark 63.75 -0.90~ 4 
Finland 58.25 -0.56 4 
France 84.25 -0.58 4 
Germany 86.50 0.97~ 4 
Great Britain 110.00 0.95~ 4 
Ireland 63.00 0.69~ 3 
Italy 87.00 0.27 4 
Netherlands 73.75 0.99** 4 
Norway 57.25 0.38 4 
Sweden 64.00 0.38 4 
Switzerland 78.75 -0.42 4 
United States 614.75 0.96* 4 
Total  115.13 0.01#  63 
~p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 (two-tailed test for significance) 
# controlled for differences in country means this relationship is identically strong and 
non-significant. 
 
Table 2 Explaining imprisonment in 16 countries (1992-2001), ML multi-level analyses 
Independents Model 0$ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.03  -0.01. 0.03  -0.01  
Expenditures on welfare benefits -- -0.05  -0.10  -0.10  
Welfare generosity  -- 0.01  -0.01  -0.04  
Flexible labour -- -0.05  0.00  0.00  
Support for neo-liberal policies -- -- 0.06  0.08  
Support for neo-rightist policies -- -- -- 0.10** 
R2 country level 0 0.02 0.08 0.18 
R2 year level 0 0 0 0.33 
R2 -- -- -- -- 
-2ll 33.25 32.54 30.75 24.006 
∆df 0 3 1 1 
N 63 63 63 63 
* p<0.05 **p<0.01, (two-tailed test for significance) 
$ Variance country-level 0.74 variance year level 0.46 
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Table 3 Explaining imprisonment in 16 countries (1992-2001), OLS multiple regression analysis 
Independents β 
Constant -- 
Expenditures on welfare benefits -0.23  
Welfare generosity  -0.16  
Flexible labour 0.09  
Support for neo-liberal policies 0.08  
Support for new-rightist policies 0.44*** 
R2(adjusted) 0.43 
N 63 
~p<0.10; * p<0.05 **p<0.01, (two-tailed test for significance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 The relationships between support for neo-rightist policies and indicators of economic neo-
liberalisation (Pearson’s r and OLS multiple regression analysis; N=63) 
 Zero-order correlations β 
Flexible labour -.30* -.24~ 
Welfare generosity -.22  .01  
Support for neo-liberal policies .16  .09  
Expenditures on welfare 
benefits 
-.19  -.12  
R2 (adjusted)  .05 
N 63 63 
~p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01, (two-tailed test for significance) 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table 5 Means and trends of the independent variables in 16 countries (1992-2001; Pearson’s r) 
 
Support for new-
rightist policies 
Support for neo-
liberal policies 
Welfare generosity Expenditures on 
welfare benefits 
Flexible labour  
Country Mean Trend Mean Trend Mean Trend Mean Trend Mean Trend N 
Australia 33.75 .83 70.58 -.37 19.95 -.97* 16.93 .88 4.25 .86 4 
Austria 12.00 .34 79.20 .62 28.65 .40 25.48 .23 6.43 .81 4 
Belgium 6.80 -.89 -29.20 -.88 32.78 -.04 26.03 -.39 4.79 .97* 4 
Canada -13.18 .67 55.15 .63 25.05 -.29 19.00 -.97* 11.07 .97* 4 
Denmark 18.98 .37 31.58 .07 36.00 -.89 27.28 -.36 9.46 -.81 4 
Finland 11.78 .03 -123.50 .93~ 32.75 -.99** 26.40 -.97* 14.74 -.97* 4 
France 21.83 .64 37.03 -.98* 29.20 -.98* 27.78 .43 11.79 .97* 4 
Germany 17.85 .89 -13.75 .74 28.28 -.97* 26.23 .51 11.06 .88 4 
Great Britain 19.28 .94~ -2.68 -.72 21.18 .51 20.03 -.44 15.60 .67 4 
Ireland 9.10 .87 -29.50 .87 23.47 .92 15.60 -.95 7.07 .22 3 
Italy 15.75 .73 60.45 .77 24.40 .77 21.70 .83 6.97 .92~ 4 
Netherlands -17.93 .82 2.58 -.04 32.60 .84 21.95 -.99** 9.35 .99** 4 
Norway 19.70 .91~ -27.03 .95* 41.00 .71 23.90 -.52 8.71 -.99** 4 
Sweden 13.78 .27 8.84 .62 35.18 -.53 31.83 -.99** 12.22 .75 4 
Switzerland 11.78 -.77 4.75 -.04 23.63 -.91~ 17.80 .91~ 12.19 -.99** 4 
United States 55.80 .48 33.70 -.94 18.98 -.80 15.13 -.16 4.52 -.99** 4 
Total # 14.91 .29* 15.57 .21 28.39 -.06 22.80 -.08 8.79 .09 63 
~p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; (two-tailed test for significance) 
# controlled for differences in country means the reported trends are identically strong and (non-)significant. 
 
 
